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Abstract 
This study investigates firms’ decision to withhold the identity of their major customers. 
I first document that the extent of private firms in the industry (private firm intensity) 
relates positively to non-disclosure of major customer identity. I next determine whether 
these results are motivated by competitive cost or agency cost concerns. Consistent with 
competitive cost concerns, the relation between private firm intensity and non-disclosure 
increases when operations involving major customer relationships are highly profitable. 
In addition, consistent with agency cost concerns, the positive relation between private 
firm intensity and non-disclosure increases when operations involving major customers 
are highly unprofitable. While disclosure of customer identity is mandated by the SEC, 
firms with unprofitable customer relationships appear better able to conceal these 
identities (i.e., to avoid disclosure requirements) by using the excuse of competitive harm 
from private firm intensity. As further evidence of agency cost, non-disclosure is 
increasing when major customers are better able to extract rents and when managers have 
low ability. As a final test, I find that non-disclosure of customer identity delays investors’ 
ability to assess the impact of customer distress on the supplier’s firm value. Results from 
this study demonstrate the important role that private firm intensity and customer 
relationship profitability jointly play in corporate disclosure decisions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Firms often claim that competitive harm from disclosure is more severe when they 
face private competitors (i.e., when private firm intensity is high). Theories on 
informational herding and strategic disclosures in competitive environments support 
these claims (e.g., Dye and Sridhar 1995 and Gigler, Hughes, and Rayburn 1994). 
Specifically, firms have incentives to conceal information that can help competitors, 
especially private firms who are not required to provide similar disclosures. From a 
practical standpoint, private firm intensity is important because regulators more seriously 
consider firms’ claims about competitive harm when this potential harm emanates from 
privately-held competitors. For example, Issue #4 of the SFAS 131 Exposure Draft of 
1997 dealt exclusively with complaints related to private firm intensity. Currently, similar 
claims are delaying the implementation of Section 1504 of the 2010 Dodd Frank Act. 
Overall, firms facing high private firm intensity prefer non-disclosure due to competitive 
harm concerns (proprietary cost, hereafter, referred to as the “PC motive”). 
However, non-disclosure may be affected by an alternative motive. Specifically, 
when the percentage of private firms is high, managers may more likely use the excuse 
of competitive harm to hide unfavorable news (agency cost, hereafter, referred to as the 
“AC motive”). Consistent with this perspective, prior literature states that “a plausible 
proprietary cost motive is necessary for the agency cost motive to potentially exist” (Bens, 
Berger and Monahan 2011, pg. 418). Also, some critics claim that firms use the excuse 
of competitive harm in the presence of private firm intensity when disclosure would 
reveal unfavorable news. For example, investor Richard Roe recently made this claim 
following Yongye International’s “competitive harm” explanation for non-disclosure of 
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major customer names (Roe 2011).1  Therefore, non-disclosure in the face of high private 
firm intensity does not unambiguously identify firms with high proprietary costs, yet 
numerous firms use claims of competitive harm from high private firm intensity to obtain 
exemptions from mandatory disclosure requirements. I collect sales data on over one 
million U.S. private firms and disentangle these competing explanations (agency versus 
proprietary cost) for why firms with private rivals prefer not to disclose the identity of 
major customers. 
Specifically, I distinguish firms whose non-disclosure decisions are likely 
motivated by competitive harm concerns (i.e., revealing proprietary information to 
competitors) from those likely motivated by concerns about the negative consequences 
of bad news revelation (i.e., revealing unfavorable information to external monitors). The 
major customer disclosure setting is particularly suited to this research question for four 
key reasons. First, the rules governing the disclosure of major customer name provide 
managers with sufficient discretion. Specifically, U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Regulation S-K requires firms to disclose the name of customers that 
generate 10% of consolidated sales, but non-disclosure is acceptable if managers perceive 
the customers to be immaterial. In practice, firms frequently acknowledge that major 
customers exist, but they choose not to disclose their names (average of 42% within my 
sample).2  
                                                 
1 Major customer refers to any customer whose existence is acknowledged by the firm in its 10-K 
segment reporting footnote and/or customer concentration disclosure. The “firm” refers to the supplier. 
2 Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012) study the effect of proprietary costs on firms’ decisions to withhold the 
names of major customers. They report that 28% of the major customers in their 1976-2006 sample are not 
identified by name. Concealment of a major customer’s name does not necessarily constitute non-
compliance with major customer disclosure rules because the 10% threshold is not a sufficient condition 
for determining a reportable customer.  Managers must also determine whether the loss of the customer 
would have a material adverse effect on the firm. Because managers can exercise considerable discretion 
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Second, there is no uncertainty about managers’ information endowment within 
the major customer name disclosure setting. Firms acknowledge the existence of major 
customers such that the absence of a customer’s name precisely reflects customer name 
concealment. In other words, it is clear that non-disclosure is due to strategic withholding 
and not due to lack of reportable information. Third, customer name disclosures are 
informative to both competitors and external monitors. A customer’s name is typically 
disclosed with financial information that is informative about the profitability and risks 
associated with the specific customer. For example, linking the customer to a business 
and a geographic segment potentially provides information about segment-level 
profitability, cost of goods sold, and research and development expenditures. 
Stakeholders can predict future levels and the riskiness of the major customer segment 
cashflows by analyzing the customer’s financial statements, press releases, credit ratings, 
analyst reports etc.  
Fourth, these stakeholders significantly rely on suppliers’ 10-Ks to determine 
customer identity and the associated financial information. To illustrate, out of a sample 
of 188 customers that are not identified by name in Compustat, Ellis, Fee and Thomas 
(2012) are only able to discern the identities of 10 customers after a detailed search in 
Factiva.com and SEC filings. Also, business credit reporting agencies such as Experian 
or trade associations are only able to reveal voluntarily reported major customer 
relationships.3 Even when stakeholders can determine major customer identity from 
                                                 
in defining the materiality of a customer’s effect, observed major customer disclosures are somewhat 
voluntary. 
3 Of the more than 500,000 suppliers extending credit, only about 10,000 report 
(http://www.experian.com/small-business/building-small-business-credit.jsp). I am unable to determine 
whether only firms that disclose major customer names report customer information to Experian. 
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external sources, their ability to perform meaningful analysis is restricted in the absence 
of major customer disclosures: in this instance, the financial numbers reported in 10-Ks 
are not easily traceable to specific customers. Overall, the major customer name 
disclosure setting is ideal for examining whether firms with high private firm intensity 
withhold disclosures to mitigate proprietary or agency costs.  
Relative to suppliers with dispersed customers, those in major customer 
relationships often sacrifice profit margins for economies of scale (Irvine, Park, and 
Yildizhan 2014). However, despite this norm, some suppliers in major customer 
relationships are still able to negotiate trade terms that yield high financial performance. 
A major customer relationship can yield higher financial performance and consequently 
have higher proprietary costs when it enhances working capital management and 
facilitates streamlined supplier production processes (Kalwani and Narayandas 1995; 
Kinney and Wempe 2002; Patatoukas 2012). I consider major customer relationships to 
have high proprietary costs when (1) the supplier reports high profits relative to firms in 
the same industry (top quartile), and (2) the supplier derives at least 20% of its sales from 
major customers.4 
Conversely, I consider major customer relationships to have high agency costs 
when (1) the supplier reports low profits relative to firms in the same industry (bottom 
quartile), and (2) the supplier derives at least 20% of its sales from the relationships. 
Consistent with economic theory, I perceive agency problems of major customer 
                                                 
4 Identifying proprietary costs using benchmarked profitability is consistent with extant literature, trade 
organizations, and courts (e.g., Li, Lundholm, and Minnis 2013; Hoberg and Phillips 2015). Requiring 
customers to account for at least 20% of sales ensures that customers are responsible for a significant 
portion of firm performance and in turn, capable of altering disclosure decisions. As the choice of 20% is 
somewhat arbitrary, I evaluate sensitivity of results to alternative cutoffs of 15% and 25% and to eliminating 
the 20% condition.    
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relationships to arise when managers make decisions regarding major customers that do 
not meet stakeholders’ goal of firm profit maximization. These poor decisions might be 
due to low managerial ability (e.g., inability to win deals with non-rent extracting 
customers) or diversion of resources for private gain (Grossman and Hart 1980; Lambert 
2001). For example, low profits can arise when suppliers, which are often smaller than 
their major customers, depend heavily on a few major customers for survival. Prior 
research finds that major customers constitute an average of 35% of a dependent 
supplier’s total sales, but those sales represent only 1% of a major customer’s cost of 
goods sold (Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers 2008; Cen, Dasgupta, and Sen 2012). 5  
Dominant customers can extract rents by demanding negative net present value customer-
specific investments and steep price cuts of their suppliers. Customer name disclosure 
can better reveal that current low profits are not due to circumstances beyond managerial 
control, and will likely persist in the future because these profits are sourced from 
powerful rent-extracting customers. 
I devise a test which distinguishes the proprietary cost and agency cost motives 
for non-disclosure of major customer identity when firms face high private firm intensity. 
I partition my sample into three groups: firms with highly profitable major customer 
relationships (PC-motive sample), firms with highly unprofitable major customer 
relationships (AC-motive sample), and control firms with neither strong PC nor AC 
motives (hereafter referred to as the “Base” sample). I use S&P Capital IQ, U.S. Census, 
and LexisNexis Academic to collect sales and location data on over one million U.S. 
                                                 
5 As an example of agency concerns in a supplier’s customer relationship, GT Advanced Technology, a 
supplier heavily dependent on Apple, recently filed for bankruptcy following Apple’s stringent contract 
requirements and refusal to make an installment payment (Business Insider 2014).   
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privately-held firms. Using Compustat Customer file, I identify 32,734 unique major 
customer identity-labels and manually distinguish named from unnamed customers. The 
final sample consists of 20,314 firm-years (3,866 firms) from 1999 to 2013. I expect the 
percentage of private firms within the industry to relate positively to non-disclosure of 
customer names, and this relation to become stronger for both the PC-motive and AC-
motive samples compared to the Base sample.  
I find three main results. First, I establish that non-disclosure of major customer 
names relates positively to the percentage of private firms in the industry. This result is 
consistent with either a proprietary cost explanation or an agency cost explanation. The 
second main result is that the positive association between non-disclosure of major 
customer names and private firm percentage is stronger within the PC-motive sample 
relative to the Base sample. This result is consistent with a proprietary cost explanation. 
Specifically, when customer relationships are highly profitable, firms with high private 
firm percentage are more likely to conceal customer identity to protect the source of high 
profits from competitors. 
  The third main result is that the positive relation between non-disclosure of 
major customer names and private firm percentage is also stronger within the AC-motive 
sample relative to the Base sample. When customer relationships are highly unprofitable, 
firms tend not to disclose the identity of their major customers as the percentage of private 
firms increases. These results are not consistent with proprietary cost concerns of hiding 
abnormally high profits. Instead, the results are consistent with managers concealing 
agency costs from having an unprofitable relation with a major customer. Firms are more 
likely able to use competitive harm as an excuse to avoid SEC mandated disclosure when 
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the percentage of private firm intensity is high. All results are robust to the use of several 
measures of private firm competition, the use of alternative measures of customer 
relationship profitability, and additional control variables.  
I next explore the mechanisms underlying agency cost motives for non-disclosure 
of customer name. Specifically, I determine whether the agency cost motive is more 
pronounced when there are greater opportunities for major customers to extract rents. 
Accordingly, I find that the agency cost results are more pronounced when suppliers: 
operate in durable goods industries, invest in more relationship-specific investments, 
have low market share, are easily replaceable with other suppliers, and suffer from greater 
financial distress. I also examine whether the motive is more prominent when major 
customer relationship unprofitability is more attributable to low managerial ability rather 
than to circumstances beyond managerial control. Consistent with agency cost-motivated 
non-disclosure, I find that results are more pronounced when suppliers have lower 
managerial ability. These results help to alleviate concerns about omitted variable bias 
because it becomes harder to justify why any omitted variable would explain both the 
main results and the economic mechanisms underlying the results. 
In another additional test, I examine the relation between non-disclosure of 
customer name and supplier abnormal returns around customer distress announcements. 
This test provides novel evidence on the supplier stock price implication of non-
disclosure of major customer identity. Customer distress has negative future cash flow 
implications for a customer and its supplier. Upon customer distress, suppliers face a 
higher probability of a sharp profit decline and high switching costs from terminated 
customer relationships. Hence, both suppliers and customers experience negative 
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abnormal returns around customer distress events (Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers 
2008). However, non-disclosure of customer identity is expected to impair investors’ 
ability to timely determine these potential cash flow implications.  If non-disclosure does 
hinder investors’ ability to know major customer identities, then I predict the positive 
relation between customer abnormal returns and supplier abnormal returns around 
customer distress events is weaker with non-disclosure of customer name. 
I use post-distress mandatory disclosure of major unsecured creditors in 
bankruptcy filings to determine customers that were unnamed around pre-bankruptcy 
distress events (using S&P Capital IQ bankruptcy database). Specifically, a customer 
announces distress at time t, and then at some point in the future, the customer’s supplier 
is named as a major unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy filing. I extract the supplier’s 
name from bankruptcy filings and backtrack to time t to determine whether the supplier 
had disclosed the name of the bankrupt firm as a major customer. I find that while 
customer and supplier cumulative market-adjusted returns around customer distress 
announcements exhibit a significantly positive association, this association is weaker for 
suppliers that did not disclose the identity of their major customers. This result provides 
evidence that outsiders cannot readily determine names of undisclosed customers and that 
non-disclosure of customer name is costly to investors. 
This study makes at least three contributions. First, the results are useful for 
evaluating constituents’ response to SEC comment letters and standard setters’ exposure 
drafts, which are often based on competitive harm. I find that even when rules do not 
allow for competitive harm exceptions, firms facing private competitors use discretion to 
withhold information. Most importantly, I document conditions under which non-
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disclosure given private firm intensity does not necessarily imply high proprietary costs 
but instead indicates high agency costs. Consequently, for the first time, I provide 
empirical evidence on investors’ speculation that non-disclosure of major customer name 
is designed to hide unprofitable decisions regarding major customers (e.g., Roe 2011). 
The direct implication of this finding for regulators, auditors, and investors is that they 
can better identify firms using private firm intensity as an excuse for non-disclosure and 
demand more competitive harm proof from such firms. This implication extends to 
ongoing SEC efforts to implement Section 1504 of the 2010 Dodd Frank Act, which 
would require project-level disclosures of firms in the extractive industries. It is timely as 
the SEC evaluates numerous claims that project-level disclosures of financial items would 
put companies at a competitive disadvantage with private companies that are not required 
to make similar disclosures (SEC 2015).6  
Second, the results highlight a potential unintended consequence of conflicting 
U.S. GAAP versus SEC rules. SFAS 131 states that “firms need not disclose the name of 
the customer” whereas SEC Reg S-K requires disclosure of the name. Evidence of a 
strong affinity for non-disclosure of customer information by firms in unprofitable 
customer relationships suggests potentially costly, selective divergence of practice when 
rules conflict.  I illustrate evidence of these costs by providing evidence that non-
disclosure impairs investors’ ability to timely assess the impact of customer distress on 
supplier firm value.  
Third, this study extends three main literature streams. First, it extends studies 
that infer a proprietary cost explanation from the positive relation between private firm 
                                                 
6 https://www.sec.gov/comments/df-title-xv/resource-extraction-issuers/resource-extraction-issuers.shtml  
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percentage and non-disclosure (e.g. Bens, Berger, and Monahan 2011 and Ali, Klasa, and 
Yeung 2014).  I document that agency costs are an additional explanation for this relation, 
implying that private firm percentage is not a clear-cut proxy for proprietary costs. 
Second, this study contributes to studies on the relation between proprietary costs, agency 
costs and corporate disclosures. To my knowledge, the study by Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 
(2012) is the first and only study that examines motives for customer name disclosures. 
Their study focuses only on proprietary costs. I extend this research to agency cost-
motivated non-disclosure. Third, I build upon emerging studies that examine supplier 
stock price response to named major customer events (e.g., Hertzel, Li, Officer and 
Rodgers 2008). Distinct from these studies, I study customer distress events using an 
approach that allows me to discern unnamed major customers (i.e., using ex-post 
mandatory disclosure of customer identity). Examination of both named and unnamed 
customers enables me to provide, for the first time, direct evidence on supplier stock price 
implications of not identifying a major customer. 
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Chapter 2: Regulatory Background and Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Regulatory Background 
SEC Regulation S-K and SFAS 131 (now ASC 280) govern major customer 
disclosures. SEC Regulation S-K requires firms to disclose the existence, identity, 
relationship with, and sales to any customer that comprises at least 10% of a firm’s 
consolidated sales revenues if the loss of the customer would have a material adverse 
impact on the firm.7 This rule also requires firms to identify the segment(s) making the 
sale to the major customer. Because SFAS 131 requires firms to disclose profits, sales, 
and assets for each identified segment, this information is also assigned to a major 
customer when the customer is identified with the segment. The main difference between 
Regulation S-K and SFAS 131 is that the latter rule does not require firms to disclose the 
name of their material customers. 
 In practice, firms frequently acknowledge major customers but choose to conceal 
their names (average of 42% within my sample).  The following are examples of non-
disclosure and disclosure of customer names from Sevcon’s 2006 10-K and 2013 10-K, 
respectively: 
 
“In fiscal 2006 Tech/Ops Sevcon's largest customer accounted for 17% of sales …”  
“In 2013 Sevcon, Inc.'s largest customer, Toyota Group, accounted for 10% of sales...”  
 
 
                                                 
7 For a more precise description of the SEC’s regulations regarding major customer disclosures, see 
Regulation S-K subpart 229.101 available at  http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/text-
idx?node=17:3.0.1.1.11&rgn=div5#se17.3.229_1101. Also, see excerpts of the relevant rules on page 721 
of Ellis, Fee and Thomas (2012).  
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One possible reason for non-disclosure is that U.S. GAAP and SEC rules conflict 
on the requirement to disclose customer names. Regulation S-K requires customer name 
disclosure while SFAS 131 does not. Moreover, disclosure is required under Regulation 
S-K only if management determines that the customer is material to the firm, providing 
managerial discretion as to the “materiality” threshold of disclosure. Furthermore, firms 
often believe that non-disclosure of relevant information is acceptable if disclosure would 
result in competitive harm. This perception is likely enhanced by the SEC’s provision of 
competitive harm exceptions for some rules (Thompson 2011).  I focus on firms’ 
incentives to conceal customer name when they face many private competitors. 
2.2 Private Firm Intensity 
Models of informational herding and strategic disclosures in competitive 
environments predict that as more firms choose not to disclose information, the more 
likely it is that industry rivals will choose not to disclose information. For example, in 
Dye and Sridhar (1995), managers mimic the disclosure policy of rivals in order to 
mitigate negative payoff externalities such as downward stock price revisions. Since 
private firms are industry rivals providing very little public information, these models 
suggest non-disclosure is higher in industries with a high concentration of private firms. 
Theories of strategic disclosures in competitive environments also propose information 
withholding is prevalent when rivals do not have to make a disclosure decision, such as 
private firms in the U.S. (e.g. Gigler, Hughes, and Rayburn 1994; Hayes and Lundohlm 
1996; and Hwang and Kirby 2000). Hence, these theories suggest that public firms facing 
high private firm intensity prefer non-disclosure for competitive reasons.  
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As empirical evidence consistent with these theories, non-disclosure by public 
peers relates positively to non-disclosure of capital expenditure forecasts (Brown, Gordon 
and Werners 2006) and major customer name (Ellis, Fee and Thomas 2012). Bens, Berger 
and Monahan (2011) find a positive association between private firm intensity and 
segment reporting non-disclosure. Ali, Klasa, and Yeung (2014) also find that private 
firm intensity relates positively to non-disclosure (measured as management forecast 
infrequency and poor analysts’ disclosure ratings).  
Consistent with these studies, I expect firms to mimic the disclosure policy of 
their privately-held competitors by concealing major customer names. I hypothesize the 
following: 
H1:  Non-disclosure of major customer names relates positively to the extent 
of private firms in the industry.  
 
Overall, firms appear to justify their non-disclosure of customer names primarily with 
three reasons: (1) competitive harm, (2) immateriality, and (3) requests from customers 
to hide their names (e.g., Yongye International’s press release in 2011, Cabot Oil and Gas 
Corp’s response to a 2009 SEC comment letter, and Adtran Inc 2011 Q1 and Q4 
conference calls).8  The first reason is most frequently cited. Disclosure of customer 
names could provide valuable information to competitors by revealing key targets or 
alliances. Private firms are not required to reveal their major customers. Thus, non-
disclosure of major customer names in industries with high percentage of private firms 
                                                 
8 Yongye(http://en.prnasia.com/pr/2011/03/24/110275311.shtml); Cabot 
(http://secfilings.nyse.com/filing.php?doc=1&attach=ON&ipage=7165399&rid=23); 
Adtran(http://seekingalpha.com/article/593241-adtran-inc-where-are-the-numbers) 
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may be motivated by proprietary cost reasons. However, non-disclosure of major 
customer names in industries with high percentage of private firms may also be motivated 
by agency costs (distinct from proprietary costs). I discuss both motives in detail in the 
following two sections. 
2.3 Proprietary Costs 
From a theoretical perspective, the relation between proprietary costs and non-
disclosure is situation-specific, with predictions sensitive to various assumptions (Vives 
1990). For example, some models posit disclosure is more likely when the threat of 
competition comes from potential entry, but less likely when the threat is from 
incumbents. Given the highly stylized nature of these disclosure models, it is not 
surprising that empirical tests generally provide mixed evidence (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and 
Walther 2010).  
 Empirical tests document the relation between proprietary costs and disclosure 
using a variety of proxies for proprietary costs. For example, regarding studies that 
measure competition using industry concentration, some report a positive relation 
between industry concentration and non-disclosure (segment aggregation [Harris 1998; 
Bens, Berger and Monahan 2011] and infrequent management earnings forecasts [Ali, 
Klasa and Yeung 2010]). Conversely, others report that non-disclosure is decreasing in 
industry concentration (e.g., lower propensity to redact material contracts from filings 
[Verrecchia and Weber 2006]). Overall, earlier studies on proprietary costs and disclosure 
yield conflicting results, leading to calls for additional research (e.g., Beyer, Cohen, Lys 
and Walther 2010; Lang and Sul 2014). 
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  A potential reason for conflicting results is the use of disclosure settings with 
insufficiently high proprietary costs. Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012) address this concern 
when they provide initial evidence on the proprietary costs of major customer name 
disclosure. They advance convincing arguments that information about a firm’s major 
customers is proprietary (i.e., it can help rivals compete with the firm). For example, 
revealing the identities of a firm’s customer can enable a rival to approach these 
customers in an effort to capture the customer relationships and to estimate the productive 
capacity of the disclosing firm. Competitors may also use the identity of a major customer 
to acquire the customer (e.g. Hart, Tirole, Carlton, and Williamson 1990).  Using this 
reasoning, Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012) find the likelihood of concealing a major 
customer’s name is positively associated with proprietary cost proxies that include 
advertising costs, research and development, and intangible assets. I extend their by 
introducing a different dimension of proprietary costs (private firm competition) and by 
demonstrating the agency cost incentives embedded in this dimension.  
I expect firms’ incentives to conceal major customer identity for proprietary cost 
reasons to be stronger when customer relationships are highly profitable. Such customers 
are more attractive to rivals because they portray greater opportunities for high profits. In 
other words, rivals are more likely to gain a competitive advantage from capturing the 
business of such customers. I suggest proprietary costs of customer name disclosure in 
industries with a high proportion of private competitors will be especially high when 
operations involving major customers generate abnormally high profits for the supplier. 
I therefore make the following hypothesis: 
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H2a: The positive relation between non-disclosure of major customer names and 
the extent of private firms in the industry is greater for highly profitable 
major customer relationships.  
2.4 Agency Costs 
Agency theory predicts disclosure can enable outsiders to monitor managers in 
order to ensure that managers comply with contractual agreements (Healy and Palepu 
2001; Bushman and Smith 2001). Therefore managers with high agency costs have 
incentives to withhold disclosures in order to prevent scrutiny of their activities. Despite 
the appeal of this theory, there is scant empirical evidence on the agency cost motive for 
non-disclosure (Berger and Hann 2003). Botosan and Stanford (2005) do not find 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that agency costs motivate the aggregation of 
poorly performing segments. In contrast, Berger and Hann (2007) find abnormal profit 
relates negatively to segment aggregation when agency costs are high. Bens, Berger, and 
Monahan (2011) document unprofitable transfer of resources across segments motivates 
managers to aggregate segments. Lail, Thomas, and Winterbotham (2014) find that 
managers use discretion within cost allocation rules to shift expenses from core segments 
to the corporate/other segment when firms have severe agency problems. Overall, prior 
studies document a positive relation between agency costs and non-disclosure. I build on 
these studies by examining whether firms use competitive harm as an excuse to disguise 
agency costs within the context of major customer disclosures. 
 Agency cost concerns related to major customer disclosures are more likely when 
customer relationships are highly unprofitable. Unprofitable major customer 
relationships can arise when suppliers become dependent on major customers. This 
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dependency sometimes forces the suppliers to concede to demands of major customers.9 
For example, major customers can demand lower prices, potentially generating lower 
profit margins than would otherwise be obtained with dispersed customers (Fee and 
Thomas 2004; Hasbro Inc. 2006 10-K). Moreover, major customers often demand 
relationship-specific investments from their suppliers, thus providing greater 
opportunities for customers to obtain price concessions. Relationship-specific 
investments require modifications to standard production processes and unique fixed 
assets that have a lower resale value in liquidation (Titman 1984; Kale and Shahrur 2007; 
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim 2008). Hence, these investments bond firms to major 
customers, and in turn, increase customer bargaining power and supplier incentives to 
comply with customers’ rent-extracting demands.  
Managers have strong incentives to conceal these relationships for two reasons. 
First, revelation of the source of low profitability through customer name better highlights 
that poor firm performance is more attributable to poor managerial decisions regarding 
customer relationships rather than to circumstances beyond the manager’s control.10  
Second, low profits for suppliers can imply major customers are generating abnormal 
profits. Therefore, major customers can demand that their name be withheld in order to 
                                                 
9 The high switching costs that characterize most major customer relationships prevent management from 
quickly abandoning a relationship where the customer is extracting rents to the detriment of the firm (e.g. 
Banerjee, Dasgupta, and Kim 2008). Note that customer relationship specific investments can counteract 
this effect since they raise switching costs for the customer. Also, mechanisms such as vertical integration, 
strategic alliances, choice of capital structure, equity ownership or board representation of a supplier in a 
customer firm can alleviate some of the frictions that lead to inefficiencies in major customer relationships. 
However, these mechanisms are not prevalent (e.g. Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas 2006; Dass et al. 2013). 
10 Managers should be less likely to suffer negative career consequences following poor performance if 
poor performance is due to circumstances beyond the manager’s control. These circumstances serve as 
noise in optimal compensation contracts (e.g., Lambert 2001; Armstrong, Guay and Weber 2010). 
Minimizing such performance misattribution is a major concern for corporate boards (Khurana, Rhodes-
Kropf, and Yim 2013). 
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conceal the source of their abnormal profits from the customer’s competitors.11 Customer 
letters requesting that Adtran no longer disclose their name illuminate this point (Seeking 
Alpha 2012).  
Firms wanting to conceal the source of low profits via customer name non-
disclosure may be more likely do so when private firm percentage is high because they 
perceive regulators will excuse non-disclosure when firms complain of losing 
competitive advantage to private firms. As support, such complains led regulators to 
solicit feedback on how to level the playing field between public and private firms while 
drafting SFAS 131. Specifically, Issue #4 of the SFAS 131 Exposure Draft addresses 
whether privately-held firms should be required to report information about major 
customers even if they are exempt from other segment reporting requirements. After 
requesting SFAS 131 exposure draft responses from the FASB, I select all Issue #4 
responses that are electronically searchable (seventeen responses).  Five out of the eleven 
responses that do not favor exemptions for private firms highlight the need to level the 
playing field with private competitors as support for their position.  
In summary, because a customer’s name potentially highlights customer 
relationship unprofitability, managers have an agency cost motive for withholding this 
information. Furthermore, firms with high private firm intensity may perceive that they 
have greater opportunity to withhold information because they are more likely to 
convince auditors and/or regulators that non-disclosure is necessary to prevent 
                                                 
11 Competitors can use this information to (re)negotiate more favorable trade terms with the supplier to the 
detriment of the favored major customer and the supplier. Disentangling customer’s demand for customer 
name non-disclosure from supplier’s supply of this disclosure is a task reserved for future research. 
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competitive harm.12  I therefore expect greater non-disclosure when major customer 
relationships are highly unprofitable and when the firm is more likely to use the 
percentage of private firms as an excuse for competitive harm Consequently, I predict the 
following: 
H2b:  The positive relation between non-disclosure of major customer names 
and the extent of private firms in the industry is greater for highly 
unprofitable major customer relationships. 
 
 
  
                                                 
12 As a fitting analogy, “the dog ate my homework” is a more believable excuse for not doing homework 
for a student that owns a dog. Manager’s perception of auditors’/regulators’ leniency towards non-
disclosure when private competition is high should be sufficient to increase non-disclosure.  
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Chapter 3: Sample and Research Design 
 
3.1 Sample 
I collect information on the number of public and private firms in each three-digit SIC 
code from Lexis Nexis Academic, S&P Capital IQ (CIQ) and the U.S. Census Bureau. 
Customer disclosure information is from Compustat Customer file over the period 1999-
2013.13 I retain only corporate major customers as defined by Compustat (CTYPE = 
COMPANY). I exclude governmental customers because public availability of federal 
contract awards weakens incentives for non-disclosure. I also retain only major customers 
with positive sales (SALECS > 0) because I use customer sales information to measure 
customer relationship profitability.14 Compustat does not provide any customer 
identifiers or standard customer naming conventions. Therefore, I manually check each 
customer’s name label to determine whether its identity was disclosed or not (32,734 
unique name labels). Non-disclosure includes labels such as “NOT REPORTED”, 
“CUSTOMER A”, “ONE EXPORT CUSTOMER” etc.  I further eliminate firms that are 
in the financial or utilities industries, firms with less than 5 Compustat firms in the three-
digit SIC industry code and firms in unclassified industries (SIC > 8999).15  The final 
sample consists of 20,314 firm-year observations (average of 2.23 major customers per 
firm-year). See Appendix A for a breakdown of the sample selection. 
                                                 
13 The sample begins in 1999 in order to maintain a constant accounting standard regime (i.e., only SFAS 
131). 
14 Firms sometimes disclose major customers without corresponding customer sales. Compustat assigns 
zero or a negative code to SALECS for these customers. 
15 I require 5 Compustat firms to compute the industry-adjusted performance metrics used in constructing 
AC/PC. In robustness tests, I use two- and four-digit SIC codes. In separate tests, I increase the minimum 
number of firms per industry group from 5 to 10. 
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3.2 Research Design 
H1 predicts that private firm percentage relates positively to non-disclosure of major 
customer names. I test H1 by estimating the following logistic regression model at the 
firm-year level:  
 
NOCUSTNAMEi,t = α0 + α1PRIVFIRM%i,t + βnControlsn,i,t + i,t (1) 
 
Non-disclosure of customer name (NOCUSTNAME) is an indicator variable coded one if 
the supplier does not disclose the name of any one of its major customers in year t, zero 
otherwise.16 I use two proxies for private firm percentage (PRIVFIRM%). The first proxy, 
private sales percentage (PRIVSALES%_100) is the percentage of private firm sales 
within the top 100 firms in the three-digit SIC primary industry code.17 The rationale for 
using top 100 firms is that these firms are major players with potentially higher excess 
capital. Excess capital enables firms to acquire a supplier’s major customer (or invest on 
behalf of the customer after capturing their business). These top private firms therefore 
pose a more significant threat to a public firm’s competitive advantage (Hayes and 
Lundohlm 1996). As an alternative measure of private firm competition, I compute 
PRIVSALE%_ALL - the percentage of private firm sales within all firms in the three-digit 
SIC primary industry code.  
I expect α1 in equation (1) to be positive. This result would be consistent with 
firms’ incentives to minimize proprietary costs by concealing efficient customer 
                                                 
16 Most firms treat customer name disclosure as a policy such that they either disclose the names of all 
customers or of none of the customers (Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 2012).  Results are robust to analyses at the 
customer-firm-year level and to retaining only the customer with the highest sales proportion.  
17 It is unclear ex-ante whether firms are more concerned about losing competitive advantage to the major 
players in the industry, to peers or to all firms within the industry. Arguments can be made for each scenario. 
Hence I investigate all alternatives 
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relationships from private competitors who are not required to provide similar 
disclosures. This result would also be consistent with agency cost incentives to conceal 
unprofitable customer relationships. High private firm intensity provides managers the 
needed condition to claim competitive harm as justification for non-disclosure, even 
though the real intention is to hide unprofitable customer relationships. 
 To disentangle whether non-disclosure relates to proprietary costs of highly 
profitable customer relationships or to agency costs of unprofitable customer 
relationships, I estimate the following logistic regression at the firm-year level. 
 
NOCUSTNAMEi,t = λ0 + λ1 PRIVFIRM%i,t + λ2 PRIVFIRM%i,t  × 
PCi,t  +                 λ3 PRIVFIRM%i,t  ×  ACi,t + 
βnControlsn,i,t + i,t 
(2) 
 
PC (AC) is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm belongs in 
the PC (AC) motive sample, zero otherwise. The PC motive sample is identified in two 
parts. First, the supplier’s industry-adjusted gross profit margin is in the top quartile.18 I 
use gross profit margin as a suitable indicator of major customer relationship profitability 
because it consists of revenue and cost of goods sold, which are accounts directly related 
to the customer (Kim and Wemmerlöv 2010; Schloetzer 2012). Second, the supplier 
derives at least 20% of its sales from the major customers ([SALECS/SALE] ≥ 20%).19 
The 20% condition is necessary to ensure that major customers account for a material 
portion of firm sales and in turn, will likely influence disclosure decisions. The AC motive 
                                                 
18 Sensitivity tests indicate stronger (weaker) results when I use quintile (tercile) splits.  
19 The capitalized, unitalized variables are labels in Compustat. 
 23 
sample is defined similarly. First, the supplier has an industry-adjusted gross profit 
margin in the bottom quartile.20 Second, the supplier derives at least 20% of its sales from 
the major customers ([SALECS/SALE] ≥ 20%).  
As an additional test, I use a sample of firms that meet the second condition (i.e., 
have a major customer that constitutes 20% of sales). In this test, PC and AC are defined 
based on the first criterion only. Therefore to test hypotheses H1 and H2, I employ a 
sample that uses both criteria for determining AC/PC (20,314 firm-year observations) and 
another sample that uses only the first criterion but controls for the second (14,726 firm-
year observations). For both samples, I expect λ2 to be positive to be consistent with H2a 
(PC motive) and λ3 to be positive to support H2b (AC motive). A positive λ3 would be 
consistent with skeptics’ claims that some firms use their presence in industries with high 
private firm percentage as an excuse to conceal unprofitable major customer 
relationships. 
Control variables used in models (1) and (2) consists of other proprietary cost 
proxies and determinants of non-disclosure of customer names. Based on prior research 
(e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 2012), proprietary cost proxies 
include non-disclosure of customer name by suppliers’ product market peers 
(NOCUSTNAME_PEER), industry concentration (CONC), research and development 
scaled by sales (RD_SALE), intangible assets, net of goodwill and scaled by total assets 
(INTANG_AT), and advertising expense scaled by sales (ADV_SALE). Other disclosure 
determinants include the firm’s auditor size (BIGN), the log of total assets (LAT), market-
                                                 
20 Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) indicate that losses attributable to inefficient resource utilization reflects high 
agency costs. This loss can be due to poor investment decisions such as investing in negative net-present-
value relationship specific assets on behalf of major customers, or from management’s shirking (e.g., 
exerting too little effort to identify customers that can engage in profitable major customer relationships). 
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to-book ratio (MTB), and long term debt divided by total assets (LEV). As management’s 
use of immateriality to justify non-disclosure is likely more difficult when customers 
account for a large portion of sales, I control for customer sales ratio – customer sales 
scaled by total sales (CSR). Also, since customer sales ratio is a component of PC and 
AC, controlling for CSR ensures the PC/AC effect is not driven by CSR. To address the 
possibility that customer name disclosure might be determined by the number of 
customers or firm age, I control for NCUST and LAGE, respectively. See Appendix C for 
variable measurements. 
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1, reports descriptive statistics for firms with available major customer 
information.21 The first section presents statistics for all firms (20,314 firm-year 
observations) and the second displays statistics for firms with customer sales proportion 
≥ 20% (14,726 firm-year observations). Focusing on the first section, the ratio of private 
firm sales within top 100 firms in the industry (PRIVSALES%_100) is 40%. On average, 
private firms within all firms in each industry generate 49% of sales 
(PRIVSALE%_ALL).22 Overall, the descriptive statistics for the private firm intensity 
measures are consistent with prior literature (e.g. Bens, Berger, and Monahan 2011; Ali, 
Klasa, and Yeung 2014). Firms withhold the names of 42% of major customers 
(NOCUSTNAME), 18% of firms are classified as the PC motive sample (PC), and 19% 
as the AC motive sample (AC).  Descriptive statistics for the control variables are 
generally consistent with prior research (e.g. Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 2012).  
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the regression 
models with Pearson correlations above the diagonal and Spearman correlations below. 
Providing support for H1, private firm intensity (PRIVSALE%_100 and 
PRIVSALE%_ALL) significantly positively correlates with non-disclosure of customer 
identity (NOCUSTNAME).  
                                                 
21 All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile to reduce the effects of outliers.  
22 As the private firm competition measures are skewed, in robustness tests, I determine that my main results 
hold when I further winsorize these measures or when I normalize by taking their natural logarithm. 
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Table 3 presents bivariate test results for PC/AC using PRIVSALE%_100 and two 
subsamples. I use mean splits of the measures of private firm intensity to obtain High 
PRIVSALE% and Low PRIVSALE%.23 The first (second) column reports the difference 
in average NOCUSTNAME between PC and AC sample versus the Base sample for firms 
in industries with high (low) private firm intensity. The last two columns present t-
statistics for the differences in these averages. Consistent with H2a (H2b), the PC (AC) 
sample indicates greater non-disclosure relative to the Base sample when private firm 
intensity is high. The difference is not significant for PC firms for the full sample, but all 
other differences are significant. 
4.2 Tests of H1 
H1 predicts that non-disclosure of major customer identity is increasing in private firm 
intensity. Table 4 presents the results from estimating model (1).24 The coefficient on 
PRIVSALE%_100 is significantly positive for both samples [(0.588, t-stat = 9.712) and 
(0.659, t-stat = 9.184), respectively]. For easier interpretation, I evaluate predicted 
probabilities of customer name concealment at four levels of PRIVSALE%_100 (0.13, 
0.24, 0.42, 0.78), corresponding to the 1st through 4th quartiles, respectively), holding all 
other variables at their means. In untabulated results for the full sample, the predicted 
probabilities are 0.46, 0.51, 0.56 and 0.57, respectively. This means that, firms in the 
bottom quartile of private firm intensity are 46% likely to conceal major customer 
identity. In contrast, firms in the top quartile of private firm intensity are 57% likely to 
conceal major customer identity. Untabulated results using private sales percentage for 
                                                 
23 Untabulated results for median splits of private firm competition are consistent with results presented in 
Table 4. 
24 I estimate all regressions are using logit regression with robust standard errors.  
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all firms in the industry (PRIVSALE%_ALL) are similar to the results for the largest 100 
firms in the industry, as presented in Table 4.25 These results provide evidence that firms 
prefer non-disclosure when competing against privately-held firms. As firms might either 
have a proprietary cost or an agency cost motive for this disclosure preference, I next 
disentangle these motives.  
4.3 Tests of H2a and H2b 
H2a and H2b predict that non-disclosure of major customer identity is increasing in the 
interaction between private firm intensity and proprietary costs and the interaction 
between private firm intensity and agency costs, respectively. Table 5 presents the results 
from estimating model (2). The significantly positive coefficient on PRIVSALE%_100 
(0.372 for the full sample, and 0.302 for the 20% customer sales sample) indicates that 
non-disclosure of customer name is increasing in private firm intensity for Base firms. 
Consistent with H2a and H2b, for both samples, the coefficients on PRIVSALE%_100 × 
PC [(0.616, t-stat = 3.1) and (0.717, t-stat = 3.4), respectively] and PRIVSALE%_100 × 
AC [(0.329, t-stat = 2.1) and (0.402, t-stat = 2.4), respectively] are positive.26  This result 
suggests that PC and AC firms are incrementally more likely to conceal customer identity 
relative to base firms when faced with high private firm intensity. In untabulated results, 
                                                 
25 I find similar results when I measure private firm competition using percentage of private firms within 
the top 100 in the industry (PRIVFIRM%_100) and percentage of all private firms within the industry 
(PRIVFIRM%_ALL). 
26 When I estimate the main effect of PRIVFIRM% (all four measures for the full sample) separately by 
firm type, (i.e., PC, AC and base motive) and use the Wald test to compare coefficients across the firm 
types, the AC_Base difference is always positive and statistically significant at the 5% level or lower, the 
AC_PC difference is statistically significant in most specifications. In contrast, the PC_Base difference is 
never positively statistically significant. This alternative specification alleviates concerns about interaction 
terms in non-linear models. Evaluation of goodness of fit for my models find a high degree of 
correspondence between predicted probabilities and observed frequencies of major customer name 
concealment. For example, for the results presented in the first two columns of Table 5, the average 
predicted probability of non-disclosure for firms in the first (tenth) decile of predicted probability of non-
disclosure is 30% (79%) compared to the average rate of non-disclosure of 26% (62%).  
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I evaluate predicted probabilities of customer name concealment at four levels of 
PRIVSALE%_100 (0.13, 0.24, 0.42, 0.78), corresponding to the 1st through 4th quartiles, 
respectively), holding all other variables at their means. The results indicate that the 
difference in predicted probabilities between PC (AC) firms and base firms increases as 
PRIVSALE%_100 increases. For example, moving from the 1st quartile to the 3rd (4th) 
quartile of PRIVSALE%_100 increases the difference in predicted probabilities between 
AC and base firms by 280% (987%). Comparable increases for PC firms are 38% and 
102%, respectively. The results using private sales percentage for all firms in the industry 
(PRIVSALE%) are similar to the results for the largest 100 firms in the industry, as 
reported in Table 5 (unreported).27 
 Overall, the results in Tables 4 and 5 provide evidence consistent with H1, H2a, 
and H2b and suggest that managers use discretion to conceal customer identities.28 Some 
firms facing many private rivals have high proprietary costs. As a result, these firms 
protect the source of their excess profits by concealing the identities of their major 
customers. Importantly, firms facing high private firm intensity have greater 
opportunities to use competitive harm concern as an excuse for less transparent 
                                                 
27 These results are robust to additional proprietary cost controls such as industry profit persistence, Hoberg 
and Phillips (2015) competition measures (text-based product market concentration and product fluidity), 
and concentration of industry peers around the supplier’s headquarter state.  I find similar results for the 
AC interaction when I measure private firm competition using percentage of private firms within the top 
100 firms in the industry (PRIVFIRM%_100) and percentage of all private firms within the industry 
(PRIVFIRM%_ALL). I do not find support for H2a (PC interaction) when I use these measures. 
28 I find support for H1 but not H2 using a Herfindahl index-based private firm concentration measure.  At 
first glance, the negative main effects of PC and AC are counterintuitive. However, PC (AC) positively 
relates to major customer materiality (even when CSR is not part of the measure). In turn, customer 
materiality negatively relates to NOCUSTNAME due to compliance with disclosure requirements. 
Moreover, relative to the base sample and controlling for CSR, PC (AC) positively (negatively) relates to 
proprietary cost proxies from prior literature such as intangible assets, advertising, market-to-book, sales 
growth, profitability and age (Lang and Sul 2014). Also, contrary to the results in Ellis, Fee, and Thomas 
(2012), the coefficient on RD_SA is negative. In untabulated analysis, I find a positive coefficient using the 
1976 to 2006 sample period in Ellis, Fee, and Thomas (2012).  
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disclosures. Consistent with this underlying motive, firms that earn relatively low profits 
from operations with major customers frequently use discretion afforded in Regulation 
S-K and ASC 280 to conceal the source of this low profitability through major customer 
name withholding. 
4.4 Cross-sectional Tests and Endogeneity 
I next conduct a series of tests that follow from my main hypotheses. The tests have a 
dual benefit in that they are informative about the mechanisms behind the main results 
and they address concerns about omitted variable bias. Specifically, I split the sample into 
two groups based on some factor and expect results to be predictably stronger in one 
group relative to the other. This design addresses concerns about omitted variables 
because it is difficult to envision a scenario where these omitted variables explain both 
the interaction effects predicted in H2a and H2b and the cross-sectional findings 
demonstrated in this section. I focus on the agency cost results for brevity and because 
these results are robust to numerous alternative measures of private firm intensity.29  
The discussion in section 2 suggests that the agency cost motive for withholding 
major customer name should be more pronounced in two situations. First, to the extent 
that greater supplier dependence on major customers facilitates rent-extraction by 
customers, the positive interaction effect of private firm intensity and agency costs should 
be especially strong when supplier dependence is high. Second, managers have greater 
                                                 
29 However, in untabulated tests, using PRIVSALE%_100 and PRIVSALE%_ALL, I perform similar tests 
related to the PC results. Specifically, I determine whether these results are stronger when the supplier faces 
more intense competitive pressure from sources other than privately-held firms. Consistent with this 
expectation, I find that the PC results are largely evident when: the supplier’s product market is less 
concentrated, when the supplier’s products are similar to peers’, when there is a high concentration of 
industry peers around the supplier’s headquarters, and when the supplier changes products more frequently 
relative to product market peers. Contrary to my expectations, the PC results are weaker when the supplier’s 
industry profit persistence is low. 
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career concerns when poor performance is more attributable to managerial ability rather 
than to circumstances beyond managerial control (e.g., Lambert 2001; Khurana, Rhodes-
Kropf, and Yim 2013). Hence, managers have greater incentives to conceal the source of 
poor performance through customer name non-disclosure when managerial ability is low. 
I expect the positive interaction effect of private firm intensity and agency costs to be 
especially pronounced when managerial ability is low. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Dhaliwal, Judd, Serfling, and Shaikh 2015), 
I identify suppliers that are more heavily dependent upon major customers in five ways. 
First, suppliers in durable goods industries often incur high sunk costs and have longer 
operating cycles, implying higher costs of replacing customers. Following Banerjee, 
Dasgupta, and Kim (2008), firms are considered to be highly dependent if they operate 
in durable goods industries (SIC 3400-3999). Second, suppliers with customer 
relationship-specific investments have little value for these investments outside of the 
major customer relationship. Hence, consistent with Kale and Shahrur (2007) and Raman 
and Shahrur (2008), I measure high dependence as above median supplier R&D 
expenditures scaled by sales. The third and fourth measures capture supplier reliance on 
major customers based on the ease with which customers can switch to other suppliers. 
Consistent with prior research, suppliers are highly reliant if they have below median 
industry market share or have above median number of product market peers (e.g., Hui, 
Klasa, and Yeung 2012).  As a fifth measure of supplier dependence on major customers, 
I consider suppliers with below median Altman’s (1968) Z-score. These suppliers have a 
higher probability of default and loss of a major customer could more easily tilt them 
towards bankruptcy. To test whether the positive interaction effect of private firm 
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intensity and agency costs is more pronounced when managerial ability is low, I consider 
a supplier to have low managerial ability if their managerial ability score from 
Demerijian, Lev, and McVay (2012) is below median.30 
 Table 6 presents the results from estimating model (2) separately within a sample 
of suppliers with high and low dependence on major customers, using 
PRIVSALE%_ALL.31 For each dependence proxy, the first (second) column reports 
results for high (low) dependence. The last two columns in this table present results for 
the managerial ability splits. Across all measures of supplier dependence, the first column 
results indicate that within firms with high reliance on major customers, firms with highly 
unprofitable major customer relationships increasingly withhold customer name as 
private firm intensity increases. However, there is not a significant relation between the 
interaction of private firm intensity and agency cost for suppliers with low dependence 
on major customers. Moreover, the p-values for test of differences in this interaction 
effect across high versus low supplier dependence are all significant at the 5% level or 
lower.32 Summarily, these results suggest that firms’ use of private firm intensity as an 
                                                 
30 I obtain managerial ability scores from Demerijian, Lev, and McVay (2012), where the scores reflect 
how efficiently managers use firm resources to generate revenue. These resources include cost of goods 
sold; net research and development expenses; selling, general, and administrative expenses; net operating 
leases; net property, plant, and equipment; purchased goodwill; and other intangible assets. Demerijian, 
Lev, and McVay (2012) use data envelope analysis (DEA) to solve an optimization problem that maximizes 
revenue given these resources as constraints. The resulting firm efficiency measure is purged of factors 
beyond managerial control such as firm size, market share, and business complexity. The scores are then 
decile-ranked by year and industry such that the managerial ability ranks are comparable across time and 
industries. 
31 All variables displayed in Table 5 are estimated in these regressions but are excluded from Table 6 for 
brevity. Unreported results are similar to those reported in this table if I instead use PRIVSALE%_100, 
PRIVFIRM%_100 or PRIVFIRM%_ALL. 
32 In untabulated results, I also find that consistent with theory, the AC results are more pronounced for 
suppliers with more uncollectible receivables and for those with inefficient inventory management. Note 
that consistent with theory, the p-value for the PC difference in Table 6is statistically significant when I 
split firms based on the number of public-held firms competing with suppliers in the same product market 
space. Firms with many product market peers face stiffer competition. However, inconsistent with theory, 
from the split based on product market share in Table 6, the PC effect is not less pronounced for suppliers 
with high product market share i.e., market leaders.  
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excuse to conceal unprofitable major customer relationships is more pronounced when 
heavy reliance on these customers present greater opportunities for the customers to 
extract rents. The last two columns indicate that firms also tend to exhibit this behavior 
when major customer relationship low profitability is likely attributable to low 
managerial ability rather than to circumstances beyond managers’ control.33 This result 
is consistent with greater managerial career concerns when customer name disclosure is 
indicative of poor managerial choices regarding the customer relationship.  
4.5 Customer Distress Events 
A potential concern with my conclusions related to non-disclosure is that outsiders 
could obtain the identity of a major customer using sources other than the supplier’s 10-
K. I investigate this concern by studying supplier investor stock market reaction to 
customer distress announcements. Customer distress has negative future cash flow 
implications for suppliers (Hendricks and Singhal 2005). Supplier dependence on a major 
customer increases the probability that supplier cash flows will sharply decline if the 
customer experiences financial distress. Moreover, if customer financial distress results 
in bankruptcy, the supplier might have to terminate the relationship.  Customer 
relationship termination will result in high switching costs, especially for firms that invest 
heavily in relationship-specific investments (Kolay, Lemmon and Tashjian 2013).   
                                                 
33 As an alternative, I define AC using the total firm performance measure of Demerijian, Lev, and McVay 
(2012). I interact this measure and a portion attributable to managers with proxies for private firm 
competition.  Untabulated results find an insignificant coefficient on this interaction term for the total firm 
performance proxy. Importantly, I find a significant incrementally positive coefficient on this interaction 
term for the portion attributable to managerial ability. This result further confirms that managers are 
particularly sensitive about disclosing customer name when poor firm performance is more attributable to 
managerial ability rather than to circumstances beyond their control. 
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Consistent with this intuition, Hertzel, Li, Officer and Rodgers (2008) report that 
supplier abnormal returns relate positively to customer abnormal returns. Building on this 
evidence, I expect that around customer distress events, investors of supplier firms with 
undisclosed major customer names have limited information about the effect of 
customers’ distress on supplier future cashflows. Consequently, their stock price reaction 
to distress events is less pronounced than that of suppliers that disclose major customer 
identity. Hence, the positive relation between supplier cumulative abnormal return and 
customer cumulative abnormal return around customer distress events is weaker for non-
disclosed customers. This expectation should hold only if investors are truly unaware of 
the identity of an undisclosed major customer when the customer makes the distress 
announcement.  
To investigate, I study distress events that occur two years before a customer files 
for bankruptcy.34,35  To determine non-disclosed customers around distress events, I rely 
on post-distress mandatory disclosure of major unsecured creditors in bankruptcy filings. 
Essentially, a customer announces distress at time t, and then at some point in the future, 
the customer’s supplier is named as a major unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy filing. I 
extract the supplier’s name from bankruptcy filings and backtrack to time t to determine 
whether the supplier had disclosed the name of the bankrupt firm as a major customer in 
its financial statements/press releases. I identify all firms in the CIQ database with news 
articles about bankruptcy filings. I retain the sample of firms that mention at least one 
                                                 
34 By studying the interaction between customer returns and non-disclosure rather than the main effect of 
non-disclosure, I capture the importance of the distress event to the customer, and in turn, to the supplier. 
35 I limit the period to two years to ensure that a trading relationship exists between the supplier and the 
customer at the time of customer distress and that the sample size is sufficiently large. I also focus on pre-
bankruptcy distress events to mitigate noise introduced by supplier information leakage around the 
customer’s bankruptcy petition date.  
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major unsecured creditor that does not operate in financial, real estate, insurance, utilities, 
or employment agencies industries in the bankruptcy press release. I consider the retained 
creditors to be trade creditors (i.e., suppliers). I verify that this consideration is reasonable 
by ensuring that for a random sample of bankruptcy petitions, the claims of these creditors 
are trade payables.36 I also retain only observations with available CRSP information for 
the suppliers and customers.      
I match the suppliers from the bankruptcy filings to the Compustat Customer 
Segment database. By so doing, I only consider suppliers that typically disclose major 
customer information. NOCUSTNAME is one if the supplier did not disclose the bankrupt 
customer’s name in financial statements or CIQ announcements in the five years leading 
up to the customer’s distress event, zero otherwise.37 To increase the sample size, I add 
suppliers that disclose names of bankrupt customers but are not listed as major unsecured 
creditors to the sample of suppliers with NOCUSTNAME equals zero. I find that suppliers 
identified 20% of customers with distress announcements in their 10-Ks/press releases 
prior to the distress announcements. To determine whether non-disclosure of customer 
names dampens supplier stock price reaction to customer distress events, I estimate the 
following OLS regression: 
 
SUPPCAR i,t = λ0 + λ1 CUSTCAR i,t + λ2 NOCUSTNAME i,t 
                          +λ3 CUSTCAR i,t  × NOCUSTNAME i,t        
                          + βnControlsn,i,t + i,t                                                                                                                          
(3) 
                                                 
36 For example, Delta Airline’s list of 20 largest unsecured creditors includes Boeing (a supplier) and Bank 
of New York (not a supplier) http://bankrupt.com/delta.txt 
37 Firms might stop disclosing customer names just before the distress event. Searching for disclosure of 
customer name in the 5-year period preceding the distress announcement allows me to capture investors’ 
knowledge of such customers. Note that this choice is conservative in that it downwardly biases my 
coefficient of interest. 
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SUPPCAR (CUSTCAR) is the supplier’s (customer’s) CAR around any 
customer’s distress date between the date of bankruptcy filing and prior two fiscal years. 
Distress dates are days on which news releases about a customer indicate distress as 
categorized by S&P Capital IQ.38 The final sample consists of at most 244 bankruptcies 
depending on return window length, and an average of 4.9 distress events per bankruptcy 
(1,196 event-bankruptcy observations). Appendix B lists the types of distress events that 
are included in the sample (e.g., going concern opinions, debt defaults, credit rating 
downgrades etc.). CAR is cumulative daily abnormal return computed over two windows 
around each distress date: (-2, +2) and (-1, +1). Daily abnormal return is firm-specific 
return minus the value-weighted market return from CRSP. Given that the sample 
includes multiple distress events per bankruptcy, event observations are not independent 
and consequently, standard errors might be biased. I correct for this potential bias by 
clustering standard errors by bankruptcy. Although market-adjusted returns control for 
correlation in firms’ returns due to market-wide factors, I additionally control for 
economy-wide news and industry-wide news using year and industry fixed effects, 
respectively. Consistent with supplier investors’ under-reaction to customer distress in 
the absence of customer name disclosure, I expect λ3 to be negative.   
In untabulated results for the sample of firms with CARs computed around 
distress dates (‒1, +1), the correlation between supplier and customer CARs is 
significantly positive (Pearson=0.098) and consistent with prior literature (e.g., Pandit, 
                                                 
38 Distress events are press releases classified as “potential red flags/distress indicators” in the S&P 
Capital IQ key developments database. 
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Wasley, and Zach 2011).39 However, this correlation reduces to 0.004 for undisclosed 
customers (insignificant) and increases to 0.134 for disclosed customers (significant). 
These statistics provide preliminary support for the contention that supplier investors 
underreact to distress announcements of undisclosed customers because they are unaware 
of these customers.  
 Table 7 reports the results from estimating model (3). Column 1 presents the result 
for CARs computed around distress dates (‒1, +1), while column 2 presents results for 
dates (‒2, +2). Consistent with prior literature (e.g., Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers 
2008), the coefficients on CUSTCAR [(0.045, t-stat = 4.6) and (0.039, t-stat = 3.5)] are 
positive, implying that bad news about customers as reflected in distress announcements 
signify bad news about suppliers. More importantly, the coefficients on CUSTCAR × 
NOCUSTNAME [(‒0.044, t-stat = ‒3.7) and (‒0.041, t-stat = ‒2.5)] are negative. 
Moreover, from the last row in Table 7, the main effect of CUSTCAR for firms with 
undisclosed major customer names is not significantly different from zero. These results 
suggest that non-disclosure of customer name impairs supplier investors’ ability to 
impound customer distress news into suppliers’ stock prices. Overall, the results in Table 
7 support the contention that supplier investors cannot readily uncover the identities of 
undisclosed major customers. 
  
                                                 
39 Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011) report Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.066 between customer and 
supplier two-day market adjusted returns around customers’ quarterly earnings announcements. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This study examines two competing explanations for a positive relation between customer 
name non-disclosure and private firm intensity– agency costs and proprietary costs. I 
document that private firm intensity relates positively to non-disclosure of major 
customer names. I find a stronger positive relation between private firm intensity and 
non-disclosure of customer names for firms with highly profitable major customer 
relationships. This result is consistent with a genuine proprietary cost motive for 
withholding major customer names when firms face many private competitors. However, 
I also find that the positive association between private firm intensity and non-disclosure 
of customer names is more pronounced for firms with highly unprofitable major customer 
relationships. This result provides unique evidence of an alternative explanation for the 
positive relation between the extent of private firms and non-disclosure (not proprietary 
costs). Rather, the result is consistent with managers reducing agency costs from having 
an unprofitable relation with a major customer (agency costs).  I triangulate these results 
using alternative variable measurements, estimation techniques, and cross-sectional tests 
that are consistent with theory.  I also find that the positive relation between supplier and 
customer abnormal returns around customer distress announcements is weaker for firms 
with non-disclosed customers. This result suggests supplier investors do not adequately 
react to relevant major customer news when the customer’s name is not disclosed. 
Although this study examines incentives for customer name non-disclosure from 
the supplier’s perspective, in practice, non-disclosure could be partially determined by 
major customers. For example, major customers with non-arm’s length trading terms 
might prefer non-disclosure because rival’s knowledge of such terms might lead to 
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undesirable price wars. Disentangling customer’s request for customer name non-
disclosure from supplier’s incentives for non-disclosure is a task reserved for future 
research. Also, my results indicate that the agency cost explanation for customer name 
concealment is robust across multiple specifications whereas the proprietary cost 
explanation is not. While this result suggests the agency cost motive is dominant, I 
hesitate to make such a definitive statement given my research design. Specifically, the 
weaker results for proprietary cost might be due to an insignificant difference in 
proprietary information between firms with average and firms with high major customer 
relationship profitability. Future research might address this issue with finer partitions 
between firms with and firms without proprietary cost motives. 
Overall, results from the study support skeptics’ claims that firms use proprietary 
cost concerns as an excuse to hide unprofitable major customer relationships.  This 
practice is a potential consequence of the conflicting disclosure requirements regarding 
major customer identities under ASC 280 and Regulation S-K and flexibility in the 
definition of customer materiality in these rules. The results also provide a unique insight 
regarding the positive relation between private firm intensity and non-disclosure. 
Namely, this relation does not necessarily indicate proprietary costs as inferred by prior 
studies, but might instead reflect agency costs. Another novel result is that an implication 
of non-disclosure of customer name is impairment of investors’ ability to timely assess 
the effect of customer distress on supplier future cash flow levels/risk.   
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Appendices  
Appendix A. Sample Selection 
 Observations 
 Firm-years Firms 
Customer data from  1999  to 
2013a 65,031 10,371 
Customer Type=GEOREG or 
MKT (11,592)  (1,191) 
Financials and Utilities (4,160)    (814) 
Customer Type=GOV (3,209)    (225) 
Total 46,070  8,141 
Noisy Industry & missing 
variablesb (25,756)                 (4,205) 
Final Samplec 20,314 3,936 
   
a Compustat Historical Segment file. The sample begins in 1999 to keep the accounting 
standard regime constant. 
b.Noisy industries include unclassified industries (SIC >8999). Firms are required to 
have available data from Compustat to compute the control variables. 
c The final sample consists of 20,314 firm-years; and 3,866 firms. 
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Appendix B. Examples of Customer Distress Events 
 
Auditor Changes  
Discontinued 
Operations/Downsizings 
Auditor Going Concern Doubts  Write Offs 
Credit Rating Watch/Downgrade/Not-Rated 
Action  Index Constituent Drops 
Debt Defaults  Lawsuits & Legal Issues 
Delayed Earnings Announcements  Regulatory Agency Inquiries 
Delayed SEC Filings  Restatements of Operating Results 
Impairments   Dividend Cancellation 
 
a Distress events are press releases classified as “potential red flags/distress indicators” in 
the S&P Capital IQ key developments database. 
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Appendix C. Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variable (Measure of Disclosure Quality)  
NOCUSTNAME = 1 (0 otherwise) if the name of the reported customer is not 
disclosed. 
Independent Variables (Measures of Private Competition and Agency/Proprietary 
Costs)  
PRIVSALE%_100 = Percentage of private firm sales within the top 100 firms in the 
industry. 
PRIVSALE%_ALL = Percentage of private firm sales within all firms in the industry. 
PC =1 (0 otherwise) if:  
(i) Firm performance [sales (SALE) less cost of goods sold 
(COGS) divided by sales (SALE)] is greater than the equal-
weighted average performance of all firms in the industry-
year (top quartile of industry-adjusted gross profit margin),  
(ii) and the proportion of major customer sales to total firm sales 
is at least 20%. 
AC =1 (0 otherwise) if:  
(i) Firm performance [sales (SALE) less cost of goods sold 
(COGS) divided by sales (SALE)] is less than the equal-
weighted average performance of all firms in the industry-
year (bottom quartile of industry-adjusted gross profit 
margin),  
(ii) and the proportion of major customer sales to total firm sales 
is at least 20%. 
Control Variables  
NOCUSTNAME_PEER = Proportion of unidentified customers among the supplier’s 
product market peers (data on product market peers available 
from Hoberg and Phillips (2015). 
CONC = Concentration of sales among the 100 largest firms in the 
industry (data available from LexisNexis Academic) 
RD_SA = Research and development expense (XRD) divided by total 
revenue (REVT). 
INTANG_AT = Intangible assets (INTAN) less goodwill (GDWL) divided by 
lagged total assets (AT). 
ADV_SA = Advertising expense (XAD) divided by lagged total revenue 
(REVT). 
BIGN = 1 (0 otherwise) if the company is audited by a top five 
accounting firm or its predecessors. 
LAT  = Natural log of total assets (AT). 
MTB  = Ratio of market value (PRCC_F × CSHO) to book value (CEQ) 
LEV = Long term debt (LT) divided by total assets (AT). 
CSR =major customer sales (SALECS) divided by total firm sales 
(SALE) 
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Appendix D. List of tables 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
        
 All Firms (N=20,314)  Customer Sales Proportion ≥ 20% (N=14,726) 
Variable Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75  Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Mdn 0.75 
Dependent Variable (Measure of Disclosure Quality) 
NOCUSTNAME 0.42 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00  0.40 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.00 
              
Independent Variables (Measures of Private Competition and Agency/Proprietary Costs) 
PRIVSALE%_100 0.40 0.26 0.00 0.21 0.29 0.58  0.38 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.29 0.58 
PRIVSALE%_ALL 0.49 0.25 0.02 0.31 0.42 0.71  0.47 0.25 0.02 0.25 0.42 0.68 
PC 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
AC 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
              
Control Variables 
NOCUSTNAME_PEER 0.41 0.22 0.00 0.29 0.38 0.50  0.39 0.20 0.00 0.28 0.37 0.50 
CONC 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.22  0.18 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.16 0.25 
RD_SA 0.28 0.77 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.18  0.33 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.21 
INTANG_AT 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05  0.05 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
ADV_SA 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIGN 0.89 0.32 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.88 0.32 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
LAT 5.20 1.93 0.02 3.81 5.08 6.53  5.08 1.91 0.02 3.72 4.98 6.34 
MTB 2.28 2.56 0.48 1.09 1.55 2.51  2.34 2.66 0.48 1.10 1.56 2.57 
LEV 0.15 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.25  0.15 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.24 
CSR 0.42 0.28 0.00 0.18 0.37 0.61  0.53 0.24 0.20 0.33 0.49 0.71 
NCUST 2.23 1.45 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.00  2.60 1.50 1.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 
LAGE 2.62 0.65 0.69 2.08 2.56 3.04  2.59 0.65 0.69 2.08 2.56 3.04 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
 
Variable A B C D E F G H I 
A. NOCUSTNAME  0.10 0.12 ‒0.10 0.03 0.27 ‒0.02 ‒0.06 0.01 
B. PRIVSALE%_100 0.12  0.98 ‒0.25 0.10 0.18 ‒0.18 ‒0.17 0.01 
C. PRIVSALE%_ALL 0.12 0.98  ‒0.26 0.10 0.21 ‒0.25 ‒0.18 0.01 
D. PC ‒0.09 ‒0.26 ‒0.26  ‒0.23 ‒0.11 0.01 0.09 0.00 
E. AC 0.04 0.11 0.11 ‒0.23  0.02 0.01 0.04 ‒0.02 
F. NOCUSTNAME_PEER 0.28 0.19 0.21 ‒0.12 0.03  ‒0.06 ‒0.11 0.00 
G. CONC ‒0.05 ‒0.39 ‒0.43 0.04 ‒0.01 ‒0.10  ‒0.05 ‒0.02 
H. RD_SA ‒0.11 ‒0.29 ‒0.29 0.18 ‒0.06 ‒0.15 ‒0.08  0.01 
I. INTANG_AT 0.04 0.04 0.03 ‒0.05 ‒0.02 0.05 ‒0.07 0.08  
J. ADV_SA 0.04 0.01 0.02 ‒0.02 ‒0.03 0.06 ‒0.02 0.09 0.19 
K. BIGN ‒0.01 ‒0.03 ‒0.03 0.04 ‒0.03 ‒0.03 0.01 0.04 ‒0.03 
L. LAT 0.00 0.00 0.00 ‒0.03 ‒0.03 0.01 0.03 ‒0.26 0.20 
M. MTB ‒0.02 ‒0.19 ‒0.19 0.17 ‒0.10 ‒0.06 ‒0.01 0.38 0.02 
N. LEV 0.01 0.04 0.02 ‒0.04 0.03 ‒0.02 0.10 ‒0.33 0.05 
O. CSR ‒0.10 ‒0.15 ‒0.16 0.45 0.10 ‒0.15 0.01 0.18 ‒0.12 
P. NCUST ‒0.07 ‒0.05 ‒0.05 0.29 0.06 ‒0.06 ‒0.01 0.02 ‒0.03 
Q. LAGE 0.03 0.04 0.01 ‒0.06 0.01 0.04 0.04 ‒0.15 0.05 
          
Table 2 (continued) 
Correlation Matrix  
Variable J K L M N O P Q  
A. NOCUSTNAME 0.01 ‒0.01 ‒0.02 ‒0.01 0.00 ‒0.13 ‒0.09 0.04  
B. PRIVSALE%_100 ‒0.02 ‒0.01 0.01 ‒0.12 0.01 ‒0.14 ‒0.03 0.03  
C. PRIVSALE%_ALL ‒0.02 ‒0.02 ‒0.01 ‒0.12 ‒0.01 ‒0.16 ‒0.03 0.02  
D. PC 0.01 0.04 ‒0.03 0.11 0.00 0.41 0.23 ‒0.06  
E. AC 0.01 ‒0.03 ‒0.03 ‒0.05 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.01  
F. NOCUSTNAME_PEER ‒0.01 ‒0.03 0.03 ‒0.02 ‒0.03 ‒0.14 ‒0.05 0.06  
G. CONC ‒0.01 0.00 0.04 ‒0.04 0.08 ‒0.01 0.00 0.04  
H. RD_SA 0.02 0.05 ‒0.19 0.23 ‒0.03 0.29 0.00 ‒0.16  
I. INTANG_AT 0.13 0.00 0.08 ‒0.02 0.09 ‒0.05 0.00 ‒0.04  
J. ADV_SA  0.00 ‒0.03 0.07 ‒0.01 ‒0.03 ‒0.03 ‒0.05  
K. BIGN ‒0.04  0.17 0.02 0.05 0.00 ‒0.01 ‒0.08  
L. LAT 0.00 0.18  ‒0.17 0.28 ‒0.14 0.06 0.23  
M. MTB 0.07 0.05 ‒0.10  ‒0.07 0.08 ‒0.04 ‒0.17  
N. LEV ‒0.08 0.05 0.37 ‒0.17  ‒0.02 0.02 0.04  
O. CSR ‒0.13 ‒0.01 ‒0.14 0.07 ‒0.07  0.48 ‒0.13  
P. NCUST ‒0.07 ‒0.02 0.04 ‒0.04 0.00 0.56  0.01  
Q. LAGE 0.00 ‒0.09 0.19 ‒0.14 0.09 ‒0.12 0.00    
 
The table finds the correlation between the variables using the sample of 20,314 firm-
year observations. Pearson correlations are reported on the top right and Spearman 
correlations on the bottom left. All correlations are significant at least at the 10% level 
except the correlations in bold. See Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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Table 3. Univariate Test Results 
 
Comparison  Difference in Average NOCUSTNAME  Difference (t-stats.) 
  High PRIVSALE %  Low PRIVSALE %   
All Firms (N=20,314) 
PC vs. BASE  0.08  0.07     0.01              (0.48) 
AC vs. BASE  0.11  0.07     0.04              (3.48) 
       
Firms with Customer Sales Proportion ≥ 20% (N=14,726) 
PC vs. BASE  0.08  0.05     0.03              (1.66) 
AC vs. BASE  0.11  0.05     0.06              (4.96) 
 
The table provides univariate test results. High (Low) PRIVSALE% is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of 1 (0) if PRIVSALE%_100 is above (below) the mean. See 
Appendix C for variable definitions. 
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Table 4. Test of H1 
 
 
NOCUSTNAMEi,t = α0 + α1PRIVFIRM%i,t + βnControlsn,i,t + i,t 
PRIVFIRM%= PRIVSALE%_100 
(1) 
 
  All Firms 
 Customer Sales 
Proportion ≥20% 
Variables Sign Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
PRIVSALE%_100 + 0.588*** 9.712  0.659*** 9.184 
NOCUSTNAME_PEER  2.379*** 29.925  2.161*** 22.155 
CONC  ‒0.134 ‒1.146  ‒0.115 ‒0.815 
RD_SA  ‒0.109*** ‒5.099  ‒0.122*** ‒5.456 
INTANG_AT  0.288* 1.780  0.363* 1.901 
ADV_SA  0.839 1.473  1.213* 1.863 
BIGN  0.054 1.143  0.087 1.604 
LAT  ‒0.016* ‒1.862  ‒0.015 ‒1.535 
MTB  ‒0.002 ‒0.412  ‒0.007 ‒0.998 
LEV  0.093 1.228  0.103 1.192 
CSR  0.058 0.876  0.134 1.620 
NCUST  0.125*** 9.556  0.092*** 7.001 
LAGE  0.042* 1.786  0.104*** 3.717 
Constant  ‒1.447*** ‒14.291  ‒1.516*** ‒12.157 
       
N   20,314    14,726 
Pseudo R2  0.056    0.048 
 
This table presents results from estimating model (1). For each regression, the estimated 
coefficients (two-sided t-statistics) are presented in the first (second) column. In the first 
two columns, PC and AC are constructed with two conditions including major customer 
sales as a proportion of total supplier sales ≥ 20%. The next two columns excludes the 
20% condition for PC and AC and limits the sample to only suppliers with major customer 
sales as a proportion of total supplier sales ≥ 20%. Please refer to Appendix A for sample 
selection criteria and Appendix C for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Test of H2a and H2b 
 
 
NOCUSTNAMEi,t = λ0 + λ1 PRIVFIRM%i,t + λ2 PRIVFIRM%i,t  × PCi,t                        +  λ3 
PRIVFIRM%i,t  ×  ACi,t + βnControlsn,i,t + i,t 
PRIVFIRM%= PRIVSALE%_100 
 
(2) 
 
  All Firms 
 Customer Sales 
Proportion ≥20% 
Variables Sign Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
PRIVSALE%_100 + 0.372*** 5.137  0.302*** 3.168 
PRIVSALE%_100 × PC + 0.616*** 3.051  0.717*** 3.421 
PRIVSALE%_100 × AC + 0.329** 2.114  0.402** 2.414 
PC  ‒0.042 ‒0.539  ‒0.537*** ‒6.983 
AC  ‒0.445*** ‒6.184  ‒0.112 ‒1.364 
NOCUSTNAME_PEER  2.356*** 29.577  2.114*** 21.612 
CONC  ‒0.194* ‒1.650  ‒0.213 ‒1.505 
RD_SA  ‒0.127*** ‒5.612  ‒0.140*** ‒5.884 
INTANG_AT  0.385** 2.363  0.527*** 2.734 
ADV_SA  1.152** 2.002  1.666** 2.529 
BIGN  0.060 1.264  0.095* 1.731 
LAT  ‒0.013 ‒1.546  ‒0.012 ‒1.232 
MTB  0.002 0.394  0.000 0.057 
LEV  0.091 1.191  0.095 1.088 
CSR  0.127* 1.790  0.182** 2.172 
NCUST  0.124*** 9.358  0.089*** 6.673 
LAGE  0.041* 1.722  0.099*** 3.553 
Constant  ‒1.361*** ‒13.291  ‒1.318*** ‒10.228 
       
N   20,314   14,726  
Pseudo R2  0.059   0.052  
 
This table presents results from estimating model (2). For each regression, the estimated 
coefficients (two-sided t-statistics) are presented in the first (second) column. In the first 
two columns, PC and AC are constructed with two conditions including major customer 
sales as a proportion of total supplier sales ≥ 20%. The next two columns excludes the 
20% condition for PC and AC and limits the sample to only suppliers with major customer 
sales as a proportion of total supplier sales ≥ 20%. Please refer to Appendix A for sample 
selection criteria and Appendix C for variable definitions. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 6. Cross-sectional Tests 
 
 
Variables  Durable Goods  Relationship Specific Investments  
PRIVSALE%_ALL× PC  0.543 0.180  0.460 0.910***  
  (1.415) (0.772)  (1.565) (3.201)  
PRIVSALE%_ALL × AC  0.927*** 0.061  0.784*** 0.079  
  (3.439) (0.299)  (2.686) (0.396)  
        
 Difference  P-Value  P-Value  
PC  0.418  0.271  
AC  0.010  0.046  
        
Variables  Many Product Market Peers  Financial Distress  
PRIVSALE%_ALL × PC  0.554** –0.494  0.567** 0.290  
  (2.067) (–1.462)  (2.177) (0.937)  
PRIVSALE%_ALL × AC  1.021*** –0.124  0.700*** –0.176  
  (3.934) (–0.557)  (3.106) (–0.698)  
        
 Difference  P-Value  P-Value  
PC  0.015  0.492  
AC  0.001  0.010  
 
Variables  Low Market Share  Low Managerial Ability  
PRIVSALE%_ALL× PC  0.695** 1.023***  0.561* 0.197  
  (2.390) (3.440)  (1.775) (0.715)  
PRIVSALE%_ALL × AC  1.033*** –0.199  0.545** 0.135  
  (4.195) (–0.821)  (2.339) (0.542)  
        
 Difference  P-Value  P-Value  
PC  0.430  0.385  
AC  0.010  0.231  
 
This table presents results from estimating model (2) using 20,314 firm-year observations 
for all firms from 1999 to 2013. For each regression, the estimated coefficients (the two-
sided t-statistics) are presented in the top (bottom) row. The first and third (second and 
fourth) column of each section presents results for suppliers with high (low) dependence 
on major customers. The P-Values denote statistical significance of the difference in 
coefficients across high and low supplier dependence (managerial ability). Please refer to 
Appendix A for sample selection criteria and Appendix C for variable definitions. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 7. Customer Distress Events 
 
 
 
SUPPCAR i,t = λ0 + λ1 CUSTCAR i,t + λ2 NOCUSTNAME i,t 
                          +λ3 CUSTCAR i,t  × NOCUSTNAME i,t        
                          + βnControlsn,i,t + i,t                                                                                                                          
(3) 
 
Window =  [‒1, +1]  [‒2, +2] 
Variables 
Sig
n 
Coef. t-stat. 
 
Coef. t-stat. 
CUSTCAR + 0.045*** 3.863  0.039** 3.231 
NOCUSTNAME ? –0.005 –1.532  –0.004 –1.168 
CUSTCAR × 
NOCUSTNAME 
‒ 
–0.044*** –3.039 
 
–0.041* –1.940 
Constant  0.027 0.360  0.030 0.304 
Year FE  Yes   Yes  
Industry FE  Yes   Yes  
       
N         2,166         2,179  
Adjusted R2   0.019   0.019   
       
 Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
 CUSTCAR when NOCUSTNAME=1 –0.002 –0.201  –0.005 –0.267 
 
This table presents results from estimating model (3) using 2,166 (2,179) bankruptcy-
supplier-year observations for return window [‒1, +1] ([‒2, +2]) from 1999 to 2013. For 
each regression, the estimated coefficients are presented in the first column and the two-
sided t-statistics are in the second column. Please refer to Appendix B for examples of 
customer distress events and Appendix C for variable definitions. Standard errors are 
clustered by bankruptcy. ***, **, and * indicate significance (two-tailed) at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
